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Introduction

In Padilla v. Kentucky,1 the United States Supreme Court vacated the
guilty plea of a legal permanent resident, ruling that the defendant’s
attorney provided him constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.2
The defendant pleaded guilty to felony drug charges after his attorney
advised him that he would not suffer any adverse immigration
consequences.3 After his guilty plea, the defendant became subject to
deportation proceedings.4
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to correctly
advise defendants of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.5
Lower courts had required counsel to advise clients only regarding the
direct consequences of a guilty plea and not for collateral consequences
(i.e., those occurring outside the sentencing process).6 After acknowledging
lower court precedent, the Court noted that it has never required such a
distinction in deciding ineffective assistance of counsel cases.7 Yet, the
Court was silent as to the retroactive application of Padilla and so provided
little guidance for the lower courts.8
1. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that counsel must
inform clients of the deportation risks resulting from a guilty plea). The Court continued:
“Our longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a
consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living
lawfully in this country demand no less.” Id.
2. See id. at 1486–87 (finding that Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally deficient
and remanding to determine whether Padilla can show prejudice in order to gain relief).
3. Id. at 1478.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 1483 (requiring that, at a minimum, counsel advise that pleading guilty
may carry adverse immigration consequences but that “when the deportation consequence is
truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear”).
6. See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences,
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 124–25
(2009) (noting that most jurisdictions do not require a defendant to be informed of collateral
consequences regardless of severity); see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (observing that the “longstanding and unanimous position of the federal courts”
only required counsel to advise clients of direct consequences and noting that the Supreme
Court has never required advice on collateral consequences such as civil commitment,
ineligibility to possess firearms, and dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces).
7. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (acknowledging that lower courts have applied the
distinction, but adding that the Court did not need to consider the distinction’s value because
of the “unique nature of deportation”).
8. See id. at 1486 (requiring counsel in future cases to inform clients of deportation
risks but remaining silent as to the retroactive application of the decision).
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The stories of three defendants illustrate the inconsistent reaction of
lower courts to Padilla. These cases, presented below, demonstrate the
confusion in Padilla’s wake as to whether Padilla applies retroactively or
not, and whether its holding is limited to the immigration context.
On December 3, 2003, Roselva Chaidez, a legal permanent resident,
considered entering a guilty plea to charges of mail fraud.9 Ms. Chaidez
moved to the United States in the 1970’s and, as of 2003, was living with
her children and grandchildren.10 Ms. Chaidez managed to avoid jail; the
plea was for four years’ probation.11 Ms. Chaidez was not informed of any
immigration consequences, and she only learned that deportation
proceedings had begun against her after she filed for citizenship.12 Nearly
two years after requesting citizenship, Ms. Chaidez was called before an
immigration court that informed her the government was going to deport
her.13 Suddenly, she risked being forced to leave her family and her home
of forty years. Then, two days before the Supreme Court heard arguments
in Padilla, Chaidez filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging
that the court accepting her plea and her counsel both failed to advise her of
the immigration consequences of her plea.14
Before Padilla, no Supreme Court precedent existed requiring such
advice.15 After Padilla, the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois decided that Padilla applies retroactively to Chaidez’s coram nobis
petition and ordered an evidentiary hearing.16 Then, in a later opinion after
the hearing, the same court found that Chaidez is entitled to relief from her
guilty plea.17

9. United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 6, 2010).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the majority
cites no Supreme Court or federal case that has shared Padilla’s holding).
16. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F.Supp. 2d 896, 904–05 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(finding no retroactivity problem raised by Ms. Chaidez’s claim and stating what Ms.
Chaidez must show in order to prevail at the evidentiary hearing).
17. See United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3–4 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 6, 2010) (granting relief because Ms. Chaidez proved that she would have risked
trial for the opportunity to fight deportation rather than acquiesce to near automatic
deportation by pleading guilty).
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In 1999, Lincoln Miller, a lawful permanent resident since 1981, who
lived in New York with his wife of 24 years, pleaded guilty in a Maryland
court to possession of 448 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute.18 He
served five years.19 Fatefully, Mr. Miller took a trip to Belize in 2008, and
upon his return, was detained by immigration officials at the airport.20
Facing deportation, four years after his release from prison, Mr. Miller filed
a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to attack his guilty plea on
grounds that he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his
guilty plea.21 The Special Court of Appeals of Maryland denied Mr. Miller
relief.22 The court concluded that deportation is a collateral consequence of
a guilty plea and that Padilla announced a new rule that does not apply
retroactively.23
A third case highlights the possibility that Padilla applies beyond
immigration, which adds more impact to the retroactivity issue.24 Gary
Bauder, a United States citizen, pled no contest to charges of
aggravated stalking of a minor in 2002.25 His plea agreement detailed
his punishment but did not mention potential civil commitment, and
his attorney assured him that he could not be subject to involuntary
civil commitment as a result of pleading guilty.26 Nonetheless, Bauder
has been involuntarily civilly committed since 2007.27 The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals used Padilla in affirming the district court,
which granted Mr. Bauder relief on his habeas corpus petition.28 Mr.
Bauder pleaded guilty before Padilla and nothing in his case involved
18. Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 355 (affirming the denial of defendant’s petition for coram nobis).
23. See id. at 352 (surveying precedent that labels deportation a collateral consequence
and concluding that Padilla overruled a “monolith” of precedent and therefore created a new
rule that cannot be applied retroactively).
24. See Bauder v. Dep’t. of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that
when the law is ambiguous, a criminal defense attorney must inform his client of any
adverse collateral consequences).
25. Id. at 1273.
26. Id. at 1273–74.
27. Id. at 1273 n.2.
28. See id. at 1275 (quoting Padilla to observe that at a minimum, even when the law
is unclear, attorneys must advise clients of possible “adverse [collateral] consequences”).
Notably, in quoting Padilla, the Eleventh Circuit changed “immigration” to “[collateral].”
Id.
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immigration.29 Within six months of the Supreme Court decision, the
Eleventh Circuit extended the reasoning of Padilla to civil
commitment for sexual offenders.30
Three defendants similarly situated yet disparately disposed.
Courts will continue to face Sixth Amendment claims by defendants
seeking to vacate guilty pleas entered prior to the Padilla decision—
both within and outside the immigration context.
Different
conclusions in the Third and Seventh Circuits illustrate the ongoing
issue. The Third Circuit unanimously held that Padilla applies
retroactively.31 Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit—over a dissent—
reversed Chaidez, holding that Padilla announced a new rule and
therefore does not apply retroactively.32
Ironically, Mr. Miller’s case was also reversed on appeal.33 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the reasoning of the Northern
District of Illinois, while the Seventh Circuit reached the same
conclusion as the lower Maryland court.34 So, both Ms. Chaidez and
Mr. Miller still received different outcomes for their similar situation.
In 2010, the United States deported 168,532 noncitizens convicted of
crimes and, as of June 30, 2009, 95,000 noncitizens remained
incarcerated.35 Many of these criminal defendants may have valid
claims under Padilla. And these numbers do not consider the number
29. Id.
30. See id. at 1275 (explaining that counsel was deficient for affirmatively misadvising
Mr. Bauder regarding the civil commitment consequences of his guilty plea).
31. See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We therefore hold
that, because Padilla followed directly from Strickland and long-established professional
norms, it is an ‘old rule’ for Teague purposes and is retroactively applicable on collateral
review.”). Judge Chagares concurred regarding the majority’s retroactivity analysis but
dissented on the merits of Orocio’s ineffectiveness claim. Id. at 647.
32. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because we
conclude that Padilla announced a new rule that does not fall within either of Teague’s
exceptions, we reverse the judgment of the district court.”).
33. See Miller v. State, ____ A.3d ___, 2011 WL 5902523, *1 (Md. 2011) (vacating
the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in light of Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914
(Md. 2011)).
34. See Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 923–24 (Md. 2011) (concluding that Padilla
applies retroactively); Chaidez, 655 F.3d at 686 (concluding that Padilla announced a new
rule that does not apply retroactively).
35. Gray Proctor & Nancy King, Post Padilla: Padilla’s Puzzles for Review in State
and Federal Courts, 23 FED. SENT’G. REP. 239, 239 (2011); DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, 2010 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, Table 38, www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/yearbook/2010/table38d.xls (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).

100

18 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 095 (2011)

of defendants subject to civil commitment, much less defendants
subject to other serious collateral consequences such as registration
and civil commitment for sex offenders, the loss of civic rights, or
government benefits.36 Nor do those numbers mention noncitizens
living in the United States who have yet to cross paths with the
criminal justice system.
This Note will show that, to decide Padilla, the Court
straightforwardly applied its ineffective assistance of counsel
doctrine.37
Under the Court’s retroactivity doctrine, such a
straightforward application of clearly established law, especially in a
factually intensive context, leads to retroactive application of a
decision by the Court.38 Thus, Padilla applies retroactively.39 And
those who pleaded guilty prior to the Padilla decision can benefit from
its holding, provided they can show that they were prejudiced by not
being advised about the deportation consequences of their pleas.40
Ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine begins with the Supreme
Court case Strickland v. Washington.41 Strickland set up a two-prong
test for courts to use in determining whether counsel met the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment:
whether counsel was
constitutionally deficient and whether the defendant was prejudiced by

36. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 124 (listing serious consequences that can follow
criminal convictions and are often categorized as collateral); see also Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that requiring advice regarding
collateral consequences has “no logical stopping point” and listing other collateral
consequences (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88) (Alito, J., concurring)).
37. See Proctor & King, supra note 35, at 241 (“The Court in Padilla relied on an
unqualified application of the well-known standard that it had first applied in
Strickland . . . .”). “Padilla is like other Strickland progeny that apply retroactively.” Id.
38. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5 (E.D.
Cal. July 1, 2010) (referencing Supreme Court precedent to demonstrate that rules of general
application requiring case-by-case examination apply retroactively because they do not
create a new rule (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000); Wright v. West, 505
U.S. 277, 308–09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
39. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F.Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(“Accordingly, . . . Padilla did not announce a new rule . . . and [applies retroactively].”).
40. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an
easy task . . . a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances.”) (citations omitted).
41. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a convicted
defendant can successfully claim ineffective assistance of counsel by showing both that
counsel’s performance was deficient and also that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant).
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the constitutionally deficient performance.42 In Hill v. Lockhart,43 the
Court applied Strickland to guilty pleas and modified the prejudice
prong to require a showing that, but for counsel’s deficient advice, a
defendant would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty.44
Retroactivity analysis begins with the Supreme Court case Teague v.
Lane.45 In Teague, the Court ruled that “new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become
final before the new rules are announced.”46 The Court suggested that
retroactivity should be addressed as a threshold question in any case
announcing a new rule and that new rules are defined as “break[ing] new
ground” or when a result is “not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant’s conviction became final.”47
Thus, if Padilla announced a new rule of constitutional criminal
procedure, defendants collaterally attacking their guilty pleas would be
unable to benefit from the decision.48 However, because Padilla merely
applied Strickland to the facts of the case and precedent dictated the result,
Padilla did not announce a new rule.49 Because Padilla is not a new rule,
defendants who pleaded guilty without advice regarding potentially adverse
immigration consequences may have a remedy through collateral review of
those guilty pleas.50
42. See id. (explaining deficient performance as “counsel ma[king] errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment” and that prejudice exists where “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”).
43. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding that the two-prong
Strickland test applies when defendants challenge guilty pleas based on ineffective
assistance of counsel).
44. See id. at 59 (“[T]o satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”).
45. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989) (holding that petitioner’s proposed
new rule “should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review”).
46. Id. at 310.
47. See id. at 300–01 (suggesting retroactivity be addressed as a threshold to maintain
fairness among all persons similarly situated and admitting the difficulty in defining new
rules for retroactivity purposes).
48. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (remaining silent as to the retroactive application of
the decision).
49. See id. at 1482–84 (applying the analysis in Strickland to the facts of Padilla).
50. See id. at 1485 (“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task . . . . [A]
petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances.”).
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This Note demonstrates why Padilla did not announce a new rule. In
Part I, I review the Padilla decision in detail. In Part II, I briefly summarize
the retroactivity doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court in Teague and
its progeny. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court retroactivity doctrine as it
applies to Padilla. Part IV then summarizes the debate among lower courts
as to whether Padilla applies retroactively and why. In Part V, I present my
argument that Padilla applies retroactively because the Court
straightforwardly applied Strickland, a clearly-established rule that requires
a case-by-case examination of the facts, and as a result, it did not announce
a new rule.
I. The Padilla Decision
A. Facts and Lower Court History
After police pulled over his tractor-trailer and discovered the one
thousand pounds of marijuana he was carrying, Jose Padilla, a lawful
permanent resident of the United States, considered pleading guilty to a
charge of trafficking marijuana.51 His attorney advised that deportation
would not result from the plea due to Padilla’s military service and forty
years residing in the United States.52
Padilla pleaded guilty and, contrary to the advice of his attorney,
subsequently became the subject of deportation proceedings.53 The Court
acknowledged that this result was virtually automatic because almost every
drug offense creates a presumption of mandatory deportation.54 Padilla
sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his attorney denied him effective
assistance of counsel.55 The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied relief,

51. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477; see also Nina Totenberg, High Court: Lawyers Must
PUB.
RADIO
(Mar.
31,
2010),
Give
Immigration
Advice,
NAT’L
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125420249 (last visited Nov. 25,
2011) (“[A]mong his registered cargo were 23 Styrofoam boxes containing a half-ton of
marijuana.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
52. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
53. Id.; see also, Totenberg, supra note 51 (“The guilty plea triggered a mandatory
deportation.”).
54. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477 n.1 (“Padilla’s crime, like virtually every drug
offense except for only the most insignificant marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).”).
55. Id. at 1478 (citations omitted).
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classifying deportation as a collateral consequence outside the scope of the
Sixth Amendment.56
B. The United States Supreme Court Holding
On March 31, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky
Supreme Court and ruled that counsel must inform clients of the
deportation risks of a guilty plea.57 Both affirmative misadvice and silence
count as ineffective assistance of counsel after Padilla.58 Recognizing that
immigration is a complex “legal specialty,” the Court limited its holding by
requiring correct advice only when deportation consequences are clear but
allowing mere advice of possible deportation risks when the applicable
immigration law is unclear.59
The Court held that Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally deficient,
finding for Mr. Padilla on the first prong of Strickland and remanding on
the issue of prejudice.60 The Court observed that under Strickland, “[t]he
proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms.”61 The Court then noted: “The

56. Id.
57. See id. at 1486–87 (finding that Mr. Padilla “sufficiently alleged that his counsel
was constitutionally deficient” and reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky).
58. See id. at 1484 (rejecting a request to limit its holding to affirmative misadvice and
finding that such a limit would invite the “absurd results” of attorneys remaining silent on
“matters of great importance” and would deny clients “the most rudimentary advice on
deportation even when it is readily available”).
59. See id., 130 S.Ct. at 1483 (acknowledging a limited duty of counsel in “situations
where the deportation consequences of a guilty plea are unclear or uncertain”). The Court
continued:
When the law is not succinct and straightforward, . . . a criminal defense
attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the
deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is
equally clear.
Id.
60. See id. at 1483–84 (“Padilla has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to
satisfy the first prong of Strickland.”). “Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim will
depend on whether he can satisfy Strickland’s second prong, prejudice, a matter we leave to
the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance.” Id.
61. Id. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
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weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”62
Central to the retroactivity issue (whether or not Padilla announced a
new rule) is the fact that the Court had never before required counsel to
advise of the immigration consequences of guilty pleas.63 Lower courts,
including the Kentucky Supreme Court, had rules excluding collateral
consequences from the scope of what the Sixth Amendment requires.64
Notably, the Court acknowledged that it has “never applied a distinction
between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of
constitutionally ‘reasonable professional assistance’ required under
Strickland.”65 The Court concluded that the direct/collateral distinction
remained unnecessary to Padilla “because of the unique nature of
deportation.”66
C. The Reach and Impact of Padilla
Justice Alito, writing also for Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in the
result.67 Justice Alito wrote separately because he would have limited the
holding to finding only that affirmative misadvice about deportation risks
would rise to the level of constitutionally deficient counsel.68 Justice Alito
found such a limitation to be more consistent with lower court precedent
that required counsel only to advise clients regarding the direct
consequences of a conviction.69
Justice Stevens, in the majority opinion, countered that limiting the
holding to affirmative misadvice invites “two absurd results”: one, it
62. Id. (citations omitted).
63. See id. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring) (observing that the Padilla majority cites no
case holding that an attorney must advise criminal defendants about the removal
consequences of a guilty plea).
64. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 124–25 (noting that most jurisdictions do not require
a defendant to be informed of collateral consequences regardless of severity).
65. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
66. See id. (“Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider
in this case . . . .”).
67. Id. at 1487.
68. See id. (“I concur in the judgment because a criminal defense attorney fails to
provide effective assistance of counsel within the meaning of [Strickland] if the attorney
misleads a noncitizen client regarding the removal consequences of a conviction.”).
69. See id. (“Until today, the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal
courts was that reasonable defense counsel generally need only advise a client about
the direct consequences of a criminal conviction.”).
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incentivizes counsel to remain silent in order to avoid liability, even when
the law is clear; and, two, it denies the defendants least able to represent
themselves access to basic advice on deportation consequences, even when
counsel could easily provide it.70 Justice Stevens stated for the Court that:
“It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with
available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so
‘clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis.’”71
The Court believed its decision would have only a minimal effect on
existing convictions resulting from guilty pleas.72 The Court expressed this
belief in the face of concerns about a flood of litigation threatening to
undermine the finality of guilty pleas.73 The Court noted that it “confronted
a similar ‘floodgates’ concern in [Hill v. Lockhart] but nevertheless applied
Strickland [and] . . . [a] flood did not follow in that decision’s wake.”74
Considering that “[f]or at least the past 15 years, professional norms have
generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the
deportation consequences of a client’s plea,” the Court presumed that
attorneys have advised accordingly;75 thus, few defendants will have
grounds to challenge their guilty pleas.76
The Court further remarked that guilty pleas account for 95% of all
criminal convictions while only accounting for 30% of habeas petitions
filed.77 Additionally limiting Padilla’s impact is the increased risk
defendants face when collaterally attacking a guilty plea.78 Because “those
70. See id. at 1484 (“Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at
odds with the critical obligation of counsel to advise the client of ‘the advantages and
disadvantages of a plea agreement.’” (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50–51
(1995))).
71. Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (White, J., concurring)).
72. See id. at 1485 (“It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant
effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains.”).
73. See id. (stating the concerns of the Solicitor General, the state of Kentucky, and
amici).
74. Id. at 1484–85.
75. Id.
76. See id. (presuming “counsel satisfied their obligation” and advised their clients
competently (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)).
77. See id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, 418 (31st ed. 2005) (Table 5.17),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1219 and VICTOR E.
FLANGO, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
36–38 (1994), respectively).
78. See id. at 1485–86 (recounting Hill prejudice as a defendant’s preference for trial
over pleading guilty).
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who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain
obtained as a result of the plea,” the Court noted that defendants who do so
face a potentially “less favorable outcome.”79 Thus, while noting that it
“must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the
validity of guilty pleas,”80 the Court expressed its confidence in Padilla’s
minimal effect because “practice has shown that pleas are [infrequently] the
subject of collateral challenges . . . .”81
While the above statements imply retroactive application of Padilla,
the Court did not expressly address the issue. As lower courts apply the
decision, they continue to disagree as to whether Padilla does apply
retroactively.82 The federal circuit courts that have addressed Padilla’s
retroactivity have arrived at opposite conclusions.83
II. A Brief Review of Retroactivity
The Supreme Court articulated the prevailing standard for retroactivity
in the criminal procedure context in Teague v. Lane.84 While Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Teague announces the general rule for the
Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine, the Court has continued to revisit
and refine the doctrine—beginning the year after Teague was decided.85
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1485.
81. Id.
82. See Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“District courts have issued divergent opinions on the question of whether
Padilla [applies retroactively].”) (citations omitted); United States v. Gutierrez Martinez,
No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2010) (collecting cases).
83. Compare United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 641 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding
Padilla applies retroactively) with Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding Padilla announced a new rule that does not apply retroactively).
84. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (holding that “habeas corpus cannot be
used as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules
would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two
exceptions we have articulated”); see Doan v. United States, 760 F.Supp.2d 602, 605 (E.D.
Va. 2011) (“[Retroactivity] analysis must begin with Teague.”); United States v. Chaidez,
730 F.Supp.2d 896, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Teague as the “landmark decision”
regarding retroactivity analysis); Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 343–44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2010) (explaining that Teague articulates the Supreme Court retroactivity doctrine and “the
most manageable statement yet provided as to what constitutes a new [rule]”).
85. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412–14 (1990) (extrapolating the Teague
definition of a new rule); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (explaining the definition
and proper inquiries to ask in defining a new rule); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 227–28
(1992) (allowing that a decision that does not announce a new rule might nonetheless create
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This Section highlights the Court’s guidance for defining new rules as it has
been developed post-Teague.
In Teague, the Court determined that decisions creating a new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure apply only prospectively;
however, decisions applying an existing standard or test will apply
retroactively.86 In other words, old rules apply to all cases (whether on
direct or collateral review), but new rules only apply to cases not yet final
on direct review.87
The Court did carve out two narrow, and difficult to reach, exceptions
where new rules of constitutional criminal procedure will apply
retroactively.88 The first exception applies a new rule retroactively when
the rule places “‘certain . . . conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe. . . .’”89 Rephrased, this exception allows
retroactive application of new substantive law rather than new procedural
law.90 The substantive exception requires retroactive application for rules
that alter government authority to criminalize conduct or impose
punishment.91
The second exception permits retroactive application of “watershed
rules of criminal procedure,” which are critical to the fundamental fairness
and accuracy of the trial.92 The watershed exception applies only when a
rule is necessary to prevent “an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate
a new rule “because the prior decision is applied in a novel setting”); Wright v. West, 505
U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (“[Retroactivity] of an old rule in a novel setting . . . depends in large
part on the nature of the rule.”). “If [it] requires a case-by-case examination . . . then we can
tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that those applications themselves
create a new rule.” Id.
86. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 316 (holding that new rules of constitutional procedure
will not apply retroactively unless through one of the two articulated exceptions).
87. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (“Under the Teague
framework, an old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is
generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review.”).
88. See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004) (“Under our retroactivity analysis as
set forth in [Teague], federal habeas corpus petitioners may not avail themselves of new
rules of constitutional criminal procedure outside two narrow exceptions.”) (citations
omitted).
89. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(1971)).
90. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) (defining the substantive rule
exception to Teague).
91. See id. (“A rule is substantive rather than procedural if it alters the range of
conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.”).
92. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (requiring an exception for procedures that are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (citations omitted).
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conviction,” and the rule must “alter [] understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.”93 The Court
has noted: “[I]n the years since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a
new rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status.”94
The key inquiry, then, in determining whether a decision applies
retroactively is whether the decision announces a new rule or applies old
law.95 In Teague, the Court acknowledged the inherent difficulty of
defining new rules and offered as guidelines that a new rule “breaks new
ground” or is “not dictated by precedent” or “imposes a new obligation on
the government.”96 The Court has since provided further articulations to
guide this determination, including this warning: “In the vast majority of
cases, . . . where the new decision is reached by an extension of the
reasoning of previous cases, the inquiry will be . . . difficult.”97 The Court
later clarified: “The explicit overruling of an earlier holding no doubt
creates a new rule; it is more difficult, however, to determine whether we
announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior
cases.”98
Unfortunately, the Court concedes that difficulty remains in
determining whether a case extending the reasoning of prior cases and
overruling lower court precedent announces a new rule.99 To assist in the
confusion, the Court indicated that applications of old rules to new
contexts, when not dictated by precedent, might create a new rule.100 For
example, the Court has found a new rule in the capital sentencing context
where precedent supported a decision but did not mandate its extension
from a focus on the sentencer to the individual jurors.101
93. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 416 (“Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies both on direct
and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on
direct review.”).
96. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (acknowledging difficulty in determining when a case
announces a new rule).
97. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412–13 (1990).
98. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990).
99. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (“It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a
case announces a new rule, and [it is difficult] to define the spectrum of what may or may
not constitute a new rule for retroactivity purposes.”).
100. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992) (“[I]t is necessary to inquire
whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is
applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.”).
101. See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413–16 (2004) (“Thus, although the
Lockett principle . . . could be thought to support the Mills rule . . . . [Lockett] did not
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However, the Court has also said: “If the rule in question is one which
of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then we
can tolerate a number of specific applications without saying that those
applications themselves create a new rule. “102 Strickland is an example of
such a rule.103 The Court has found that the Strickland test is “clearly
established” precedent that does not break new ground or impose new
obligations on States.104 According to the Court, “[Strickland] provides
sufficient guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims.”105
Perhaps one of the most relevant statements related to the Padilla
retroactivity inquiry comes from Teague itself, where the Court said:
“Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question, for, once a new
rule is applied to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded
justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly
situated.”106
The Court recently ruled that State law governs State habeas corpus
petitions, and that States are free to apply decisions retroactively even when
the Supreme Court holds that a rule does not apply retroactively in the
federal courts.107 And State procedural rules can present another hurdle.
For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia recently ruled that defendants’
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not constitute errors of
fact sufficient to use certain State petitions for collateral relief.108
Emphasizing the importance and impact of Padilla, one Virginia judge has
refused to follow the Supreme Court of Virginia ruling, stating that

compel Mills . . . . Accordingly, Mills announced a new rule . . . .”).
102. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy J., concurring).
103. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“[T]he Strickland test ‘of
necessity requires a case-by-case examination . . . .’” (quoting Wright, 505 U.S. at 308)).
104. See id. (“[I]t can hardly be said that recognizing the right to effective counsel
‘breaks new ground or imposes new a new obligation on the States.’” (quoting Teague, 489
U.S. at 301)).
105. Id.
106. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
107. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 282 (2008) (“[Teague] limits the kinds
of . . . relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court,
when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is
deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague.”).
108. See Commonwealth v. Morris, 705 S.E.2d 503, 508 (Va. 2011) (“[A] claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an error of fact for which coram vobis
will lie under [Virginia] Code § 8.01-677.”).
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constitutional rights would be violated if he did.109 However, these
procedural concerns lie beyond the scope of this Note.
The reader is not alone if confused on the retroactivity doctrine. The
split among the lower courts exemplifies the difficulty in applying the
retroactivity doctrine to Supreme Court decisions. 110 This Note will
provide a more detailed explanation of the different lower court approaches
in Part IV.
III. Applying the Retroactivity Doctrine to Padilla
To determine retroactivity, the Supreme Court has given this guidance:
Under Teague, the determination whether a constitutional rule of
criminal procedure applies to a case on collateral review involves a
three-step process . . . . First, the court must determine when the
defendant’s conviction became final. Second, . . . the court must decide
whether the rule is actually ‘new.’ Finally, if the rule is new, the court
must consider whether it falls within either of the two exceptions to
111
nonretroactivity.

In order to be a new rule, Padilla would have to “impose a new
obligation” on government, “break new ground” or otherwise not be
“dictated by precedent.”112 Additionally, Padilla could create a new rule if
the decision represents an unpredictable extension of precedent into a new
factual context.113 However, if in Padilla, the Court merely applied clearly
established law, or if it applied a rule requiring a case-by-case factual
examination, then the decision will apply retroactively even if it represents
an extension of precedent.114
109. See Tom Jackman, Loudon Judge Defies Va. Supreme Court, Continues to Reopen
Immigrants’ Cases, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/loudoun-judge-defies-va-supreme-court-continues-to-reopen-immigrantscases/2011/02/06/AB3BovQ_story.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2011) (describing how a judge
defied a Virginia Supreme Court ruling) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
110. See United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (D. Neb.
Nov. 9, 2010) (citing courts coming to opposite conclusions as to Padilla retroactivity).
111. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 411 (2004).
112. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (providing general guidelines as to what constitutes a
new rule).
113. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228 (1992) (“[I]t is necessary to inquire
whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is
applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.”).
114. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
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A. Straightforward Strickland
In Padilla, the Court made this much clear: “Strickland applies to
Padilla’s claim.”115 After commenting that a direct/collateral consequences
distinction remains unnecessary to Strickland analyses, the Court justified
including deportation within the scope of the Sixth Amendment.116
Because it is a “severe penalty” that is “nearly an automatic result” from its
“intimate[] relat[ion] to the criminal process,” the Court concluded that
“advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”117
In Part III of the majority opinion, the Court analyzed the case under
the first prong of Strickland and found that Mr. Padilla received
constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel.118 The Court reaffirmed
that “[p]revailing norms of practice” guide the question of “whether
counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.’”119 Citing multiple sources, the Court concluded: “The
weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.”120 And the Court
recounted its previously stated expectation that counsel would “follow the
advice of [those] practice guides,” especially given the Court’s past
recognition that noncitizen defendants might prefer jail to deportation.121 In
fact, the Court has previously acknowledged that the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice have advised informing defendants of immigration
consequences since 1982.122
(explaining that Strickland represents “‘clearly established Federal law’” that “‘requires a
case-by-case factual examination of the evidence’” and applies retroactively because it
neither breaks new ground nor imposes new obligations on the States (quoting Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992))); Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (discussing how to determine
when a case announces a new rule).
115. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
116. See id. at 1481–82 (including deportation within the scope of the Sixth
Amendment because it is “uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or collateral
consequence”).
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1482–83 (reviewing Mr. Padilla’s claim to see if his counsel’s
performance “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’” (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688)).
119. Id. at 1482.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1483 (noting the Court’s previous statements regarding counsel’s
responsibilities to noncitizen clients (citing I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001))).
122. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) (“[T]he American Bar
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The Court remanded the case to allow Mr. Padilla an attempt to show
prejudice under Strickland’s second prong.123 But the Court warned:
“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.”124 Thus, it is
clear that Strickland disposed of Mr. Padilla’s claim.
The briefs before the Court in Padilla raised the concern that ruling
Mr. Padilla’s counsel constitutionally deficient would open the floodgates
and undermine the finality of numerous guilty pleas.125 Such worries imply
that the Court’s ruling might be “breaking new ground” and leading to new
litigation. However, the Court dismissed these concerns, presuming that
most defendants facing the risk of deportation receive effective assistance
from their counsel.126
The Court highlighted how similar concerns had proved unfounded
after its decision in Hill v. Lockhart.127 And the same principles stemming
the flood after Hill apply to Padilla, the Court reasoned, because Strickland
requires a defendant to “convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”128 The Court
then added what seems like an unambiguous statement that it expected its
decision to apply retroactively when it said: “It seems unlikely that our
decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already
obtained as the result of plea bargains.”129 If Padilla applied only
prospectively, then there would be no effect on “convictions already
obtained.”
Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice provide that, if a defendant will face
deportation as a result of a conviction, defense counsel ‘should fully advise the defendant of
these consequences.’” (citing 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 14-3.2 Comment, 75
(2d ed. 1982))).
123. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483–84 (“Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his
claim will depend on whether he can satisfy Strickland’s second prong, prejudice, a matter
we leave to the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance.”).
124. Id. at 1485.
125. See id. at 1484 (“We have given serious consideration to the concerns that the
Solicitor General, respondent, and amici have stressed regarding the importance of
protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty pleas.”).
126. See id. at 1485 (“For at least the past 15 years, professional norms have generally
imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a
client’s plea . . . . ”). “We . . . presume that counsel satisfied their obligation . . . .” Id.
127. See id. at 1484–85 (“We confronted a similar ‘floodgates’ concern in Hill . . . but
nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client
regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty.”). “A flood did not follow in that
decision’s wake.” Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (emphasis added).
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B. Breaking New Ground
The argument that Padilla announced a new rule hinges on the finding
that a noncitizen defendant facing the risk of deportation is entitled to the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.130 The
Court rejected the lower courts’ distinction between direct and collateral
consequences for the purposes of defining the scope of the entitlement to
effective assistance of counsel.131 However, Padilla does offer a novel
articulation of effective assistance of counsel—never before had the Court
required advice beyond the direct consequences of a plea agreement.132
Some, including Justice Scalia, argue that Padilla opened the door to
ineffective assistance claims for other collateral consequences.133 These
arguments assert that the Court “br[oke] new ground” in that Padilla was
not “dictated by precedent.”134 Based on this reasoning, some lower courts
have ruled that Padilla did announce a new rule and so does not apply
retroactively.135
130. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 344–46 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (relying on
lower court precedent to argue that the Court announced a new rule extending the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to cover advice regarding the deportation consequences of a
criminal conviction); see also United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at
*2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010) (finding Padilla announced a new rule because “failure to inform
a defendant of the prospect of deportation” was not required by Eighth Circuit precedent).
131. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (finding unnecessary the direct/collateral
consequences distinction applied by the Kentucky Supreme Court and other lower courts).
132. See Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to
Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (2010) (“It is the first time the Court has extended
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to a consequence of conviction that is not part of the
court-imposed punishment.”).
133. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Adding to counsel’s duties
an obligation to advise about a conviction’s collateral consequences has no logical stopping
point.”); Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 24 (“Deportation is but one of a broad range of
rights and privileges that may be affected by criminal conviction . . . .”). “At least in some
cases, these consequences will share the characteristics the Court recognized as important in
Padilla . . . .” Id.
134. See Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“[Some] district courts . . . have held that Padilla did announce a ‘new
constitutional rule,’ stressing that the result in Padilla was not dictated by
precedent . . . [and] have further held that Padilla should not be considered retroactive for
this very reason.”).
135. See Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 9, 2010)
(“Thus, this Court is convinced that Padilla created a ‘new rule’ that should not apply
retroactively.”); United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1, 2010 WL 4134286, at
*3 (D. N.J. Oct. 19, 2010) (“Thus, the 2010 Padilla decision requiring counsel to advise a
non-citizen client of deportation consequences is a new constitutional rule and should not be
applied retroactively . . . .”).
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Of course, courts have long applied the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel to collateral consequences to some degree.136
Rather than limiting the right to counsel to direct consequences, courts have
instead held that when applied to collateral consequences, the standard of
care only requires avoiding affirmative misadvice.137 A few courts have
even preceded the Supreme Court in requiring counsel to correctly advise
on serious collateral consequences including deportation and sexual
offender registration.138
Justice Alito argued in his concurrence that the Court should limit its
holding to require counsel to avoid affirmative misadvice and to at least
advise noncitizen defendants that pleading guilty “may have adverse
immigration consequences.”139 Importantly, though, Justice Alito did see
Padilla as “falling within the [scope] of Strickland,” as he makes clear in
Part II of his opinion.140 Justice Alito agreed with the majority that the
Sixth Amendment extends to require at least some advice about deportation
consequences, but he argued that the Court should only require advice of
the possibility of deportation.141 While his concurrence implies that
Strickland straightforwardly governed Padilla, Justice Alito did call the
holding a “dramatic expansion” and a “major upheaval in Sixth
136. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and
the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 708–09 (2002) (listing the
varying degrees to which lower courts require advice about collateral consequences).
137. See Leading Case: Criminal Law and Procedure—Sixth Amendment—Effective
Assistance of Counsel: Padilla v. Kentucky, 124 HARV. L. REV. 199, 205–06 (2010)
(explaining the approach “widely adopted by the lower courts” that Strickland applies to
collateral consequences at least to the degree of avoiding affirmative misadvice).
138. See Proctor & King, supra note 35, at 239 (“[T]hree state courts had interpreted
the Sixth Amendment to impose a duty on counsel to provide advise [sic] about the risks of
deportation to clients who are pleading guilty.”); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide
Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary
Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 697–98 (2008)
(discussing the New Mexico Supreme Court’s holding that counsel must correctly advise
noncitizen defendants about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea).
139. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating, “in [his] view,” an
attorney’s requirements).
140. See id. at 1487, 1492–94 (applying Strickland to reach the same result as the
majority but arguing that the holding, under Strickland, should only require attorneys to
avoid affirmative misadvice and to at least warn noncitizen defendants of the possibility of
adverse immigration consequences).
141. See id. at 1494 (“I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more
than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation . . . . ”). “[T]he attorney should advise
the client that a criminal conviction may have adverse [immigration] consequences . . . and
that the client should consult an immigration specialist . . . .” Id.
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Amendment law,” noting that the holding was contrary to every lower
federal court.142
Some lower courts have found that Padilla created a new rule based on
Justice Alito’s comments regarding the impact on lower court precedent.143
However, other courts have ruled that, in Padilla, the Court merely applied
its clearly established Strickland doctrine.144
C. So Which Is It?
So far, lower courts disagree on whether Padilla announced a new rule
or applied its existing Strickland test to the facts of the case.145 No court
has found Padilla to be a new rule that falls within one of the two
exceptions to nonretroactivity, though some have argued that Padilla meets
the requirements to be a watershed case. 146 However, given the Court’s
prior language, it seems unlikely that Padilla would fall under the
“watershed” exception.147 Then there are some courts that have avoided the
retroactivity question altogether.148 The next Section explores the opposing
142. See id. at 1492 (arguing that the majority “casually dismisses the longstanding and
unanimous position of the lower federal courts with respect to the scope of criminal defense
counsel’s duty to advise on collateral consequences”).
143. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 348 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“Justice Alito
repeatedly referred to the majority opinion as one that was breaking new ground.”).
144. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D.
Cal. July 1, 2010) (“[T]his Court concludes that Padilla’s application of Strickland’s wellestablished test for determining whether counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable
did not produce a novel result and, therefore, did not announce a new rule . . . .”).
145. See Denisyuk v. State, 30 A.3d 914, 923–25 (Md. 2011) (collecting cases that
reach different conclusions on Padilla’s retroactivity); United States v. Gutierrez Martinez,
No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2010) (“Courts that have
considered the question of Padilla’s retroactive application have reached conflicting
results.”).
146. See Gutierrez Martinez, No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490 at *2–3 (listing cases
and their various holdings on Padilla retroactivity but not listing any finding Padilla to fall
within Teague’s two exceptions to nonretroactivity for new rules); John L. Holahan &
Shauna Faye Kieffer, Effective Assistance of Counsel Where Pleas Mandate Deportation,
&
BAR
OF
MINN.
(Aug.
10,
2010),
available
at
BENCH
http://mnbenchbar.com/2010/08/padilla-motions/ (“[I]t appears that the Padilla decision is a
watershed rule of fundamental fairness, and should be applied retroactively.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
147. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 407–08 (2007) (“Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 [1963] . . . [is] the only case that this Court has identified as qualifying under
[the watershed] exception . . . .”).
148. See Gutierrez Martinez, 2010 WL 5266490, at *3 (“In light of the confusion
engendered by Padilla, several courts have bypassed the question of retroactivity
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approaches taken by lower courts in deciding whether Padilla announced a
new rule.
IV. Lower Court Reaction
Recall the defendants from the Introduction. Their disparate treatment
exists for two reasons. One arises from disagreement over Padilla’s
impact.149 Some courts have concluded that Padilla merely articulated
clearly established law that applies to guilty pleas entered before and after
the Court’s decision.150 Other courts, however, have ruled that Padilla
broke new ground and announced a new rule that only applies prospectively
to guilty pleas entered after the decision.151
The second reason for the discrepancy springs from the rationale of
Padilla. Even though the Court expressly limited its holding to noncitizens
facing deportation,152 the dissent and commentators have argued that its
logic easily extends to all collateral consequences, such as civil
commitment, loss of voting rights, inability to carry firearms, and loss of
professional licenses.153
Many seeking post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of
counsel must guess whether the court in which they file their petition will
apply Padilla retroactively and whether or not the court will restrict Padilla
to the immigration context or extend it to all unique and severe collateral
consequences. In the following Sections, this Note will show, through the
where . . . the petitioner was not prejudiced.”).
149. See id. at *2 (“Courts that have considered the question of Padilla’s retroactive
application have reached conflicting results.”).
150. See United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 637–41 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that
Padilla logically followed from the clearly established law of Strickland and Hill); United
States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010)
(“[T]his Court concludes that Padilla’s application of Strickland’s well-established test for
determining whether counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable did not produce a
novel result and, therefore, did not announce a new rule . . . .”).
151. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 686 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2011)
(concluding that Padilla announced a new rule); Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 347 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2010) (“Justice Alito repeatedly referred to the majority opinion as one that was
breaking new ground.”).
152. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (labeling deportation as “uniquely difficult to
classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence”).
153. See id. at 1496 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing that extending the Strickland
doctrine to deportation has “no logical stopping point”); Leading Case, supra note 137, at
206–08 (suggesting that other collateral consequences meet “the Padilla test,” thus
warranting similar treatment).
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lower courts’ analysis, that the Court applied Strickland to decide Padilla.
Under the Court’s language in analyzing retroactivity, Padilla did not
create a new rule.
A. Arguments for Retroactivity
In U.S. v. Chaidez,154 the Northern District of Illinois framed the
retroactivity issue as whether Padilla announced a categorical rule that
counsel must advise defendants of immigration consequences or an
application of Strickland to a case where the attorney factually fell below
professional norms at the time of the guilty plea.155 Ultimately, the court
decided that Padilla applies retroactively because the Supreme Court
merely applied Strickland, which provides guidance for “virtually all
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.”156
The court observed that lower courts have been split on the
retroactivity issue and then determined Padilla did not announce a new rule
for two reasons.157 First, the court concluded that the Supreme Court, by
not addressing retroactivity as a threshold question in Padilla, indicated its
understanding that the decision did not announce a new rule.158 Secondly,
the court stated that retroactively applying the Padilla decision achieves
Teague’s goal of promoting finality of judgments while allowing for review
of constitutional errors.159
The Chaidez court restated the Teague rule that a new rule is
announced when the Supreme Court overturns its own precedent.160
However, it also cited a subsequent Supreme Court decision that
154. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp. 2d 896, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding
that Padilla applied retroactively).
155. See id. at 901 (“Padilla could be described as establishing a per se rule that
counsel must inform a client of immigration consequences before an informed guilty plea
may be entered.”). “Alternatively, the case can be read as a straightforward application of
Strickland.”) Id.
156. See id. at 902 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)).
157. See id. at 899, 902 (“[T]he court is convinced that Padilla did not announce a new
rule for two reasons.”).
158. See id. at 902–03 (describing the principles behind Teague retroactivity and
finding that none of the three opinions in Padilla addressed the issue, apparently with the
understanding that it would apply retroactively).
159. See id. at 903–04 (stating that the flexibility of the Strickland test allows for both
the review of constitutional errors and protecting the finality of convictions).
160. See id. at 899 (“When the Court overturns its own prior precedent, clearly a new
rule is established.” (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990))).
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acknowledged the difficulty of defining a new rule when the Supreme
Court extends its precedent to a new factual context.161 Indeed, as the court
correctly observed, in cases where the Supreme Court has found a decision
to be dictated by precedent, the Court lacked unanimity as to that result.162
Addressing the overwhelming contrary precedent, the court recalled
the Supreme Court’s observation that “the mere existence of conflicting
authority does not mean a rule is new.”163 The court added that, according
to Justice Kennedy, whether a rule is new or is an old rule applied in a new
context “depends in large part on the nature of the rule.”164 Justice
Kennedy has explained that a rule of general application (i.e. one requiring
case-by-case factual examination) will lead to the Court tolerating “a
number of specific applications without saying that those applications
themselves create a new rule.”165 In the same regard, the court noted that
Strickland cases rarely yield new rules.166 Strickland, by its terms, requires
a case-by-case examination of the facts.167 In fact, the Supreme Court has
applied prevailing professional norms to new factual contexts repeatedly
without deeming those decisions new rules.168

161. See id. at 899–900 (“‘[I]t is more difficult, however, to determine whether [the
Court] announces a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of [its] prior cases.’”
(quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990))).
162. See id. at 900 (“In [Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318–19 (1989)] and [Stringer
v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992)], the Court determined that the results were ‘dictated’ by
[precedent]. Yet, neither of these decisions was unanimous.”).
163. Id. at 901 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).
164. See id. at 902 (“Whether the prisoner seeks application of an old rule in a novel
setting, depends in large part on the nature of the rule.” (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S.
277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
165. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(explaining the Teague requirements of a new rule).
166. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp.2d 896, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“[T]he
only question for this court is whether [Padilla] is ‘the infrequent [Strickland] case that
yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule.’” (quoting Osagiede v. United States, 543
F.3d 399, 408 n.4 (7th Cir. 2008))).
167. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (labeling Strickland as
established law that “of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence” and
observing that Strickland is a clear rule that does not “break new ground” when it is
applied).
168. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D.
Cal. July 1, 2010) (“The Supreme Court has issued a number of relatively recent opinions
applying the Strickland test in a variety of different factual contexts; none of these cases has
been afforded new rule status under Teague.” (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380
(2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391
(2000))).
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Chaidez observed that a critical element of a Strickland analysis is the
professional standards in use at the time the conviction becomes final.169
The court observed that the Supreme Court has for nearly 10 years
recognized deportation as a significant consequence of conviction and that
professional standards advise counsel to inform their clients of immigration
consequences to guilty pleas.170 And, as stated above, the Supreme Court
has found professional norms to require as much dating back to 1982.171
Additionally, Chaidez noted that if the Supreme Court did not
anticipate retroactivity, then its dismissal of the floodgates concern would
be unnecessary because the inquiry into ineffective assistance of counsel is
by its nature retroactive.172 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to
allow Ms. Chaidez to make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.173
On a subsequent hearing, the same court granted Ms. Chaidez relief based
on Padilla.174
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Orocio, recently concluded that
“[t]he application of Strickland to the Padilla scenario is not so removed
from the broader outlines of precedent as to constitute a ‘new rule.’” 175
The unanimous court found that Padilla “reaffirmed” the Strickland
principles that guide defense counsel’s obligations to the defendant during
guilty pleas.176 Additionally, the Third Circuit concluded that Padilla did
169. See Chaidez, 730 F.Supp.2d at 903 (“A post-conviction court applying Strickland
is bound to consider whether counsel’s assistance was effective with relevance to
professional standards as they existed at the time of conviction.” (citing Conner v. McBride,
375 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2004))).
170. See id. at 903 (“The Supreme Court, itself, recognized as early as 2001 that
immigration consequences of guilty pleas would be critically important to defendants and
that ‘competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides’ would
be expected to advise clients [accordingly].” (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 &
n.50 (2001))).
171. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) (citing the 1982 edition of the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice for the practice guideline that counsel “should fully
advise the defendant of [deportation] consequences”).
172. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F. Supp.2d 896, 903–04 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (adding
that the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry requires collateral review because few
defendants who plead guilty have grounds or desire for direct appeal).
173. See id. at 905 (“Now that Chaidez has established a legally sufficient claim for
relief, she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.”).
174. See United States v. Chaidez, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3–4 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 6, 2010) (vacating the conviction because counsel failed to warn Chaidez that a
guilty plea carried immigration consequences).
175. United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 638 (3d Cir. 2011).
176. See id. (“Far from extending the Strickland rule into uncharted territory, Padilla
reaffirmed defense counsel’s obligations to the criminal defendant during the plea
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not “break new ground” because Padilla straightforwardly applied
Strickland by analyzing long-established professional norms.177 Finally, the
court pointed to the floodgates discussion as indication that the Supreme
Court anticipated Padilla applying retroactively.178
Other courts agree with various aspects of the Orocio and Chaidez
reasoning.179 Some focus on the Supreme Court recognition that Strickland
often applies to new factual contexts but rarely—if ever—creates new
rules.180 Additionally, courts agree that the Supreme Court anticipated
retroactive application as indicated by its language dismissing the
floodgates concerns.181 Other courts hinge the retroactivity issue on the
Court’s emphasis on prevailing professional norms.182
Similar analysis led prominent scholars to agree that Padilla applies
retroactively.183 In addition to the reasoning above, the commentators
suggested that the Supreme Court indicated that creating a direct/collateral
consequences distinction would be a substitution for the well-established
Strickland standard.184 Additionally, the scholars point out that the
Supreme Court not only expected Padilla to apply retroactively but also
that it would affect the finality of only a minimal number of convictions.185
The Court based this expectation on two presumptions: that counsel will

process.”).
177. See id. (observing that the Supreme Court analyzed Padilla according to prevailing
professional norms in spite of contrary lower court rulings).
178. See id. (“[C]lose scrutiny of the Padilla opinion leads us to consider it not unlikely
that the Padilla Court anticipated the retroactive application of its holding on collateral
review when it considered the effect its decision would have on final convictions.”).
179. See Proctor & King, supra note 35, at 240 n.30 (collecting cases that find Padilla
applies retroactively).
180. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *5 (E.D.
Cal. July 1, 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has applied Strickland in numerous new
contexts without finding those decisions to be new rules (citing Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d
1162, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008))).
181. See id. at *7 (“If the Court intended Padilla to be a new rule which would apply
only prospectively, the entire ‘floodgates’ discussion would have been unnecessary.”).
182. See Martin v. United States, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 3463949, at *3 (C.D. Ill.
Aug. 25, 2010) (finding that Padilla did not break new ground because the Supreme Court
based its decision on prevailing professional norms and applied Strickland).
183. See Proctor & King, supra note 35, at 240–41 (concluding that Padilla is not a
new rule and, like other Strickland decisions, applies retroactively).
184. See id. at 240 (calling such a distinction an ineffective “shorthand” or
“alternative”).
185. See id. at 240–41 (“Without a mention of Teague, the Court explained that its
decision would not likely affect the finality of most convictions.”).
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have adhered to prevailing professional norms and that few defendants will
risk forfeiting the advantages of their plea agreements.186
B. Arguments Against Retroactivity
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, acting in its capacity as a
retroactivity sommelier, recently addressed the task of determining
“whether [Padilla] represents simply the decanting of old wine in new
bottles or the uncorking of a new wine.”187 After restating the holding in
Padilla, the court continued: “The taste test now before us asks us to assess
the vintage of [Padilla]. Will it or will it not date back to invalidate a guilty
plea entered [before Padilla]?”188
Notably, the petitioner, Mr. Miller, filed for relief prior to Padilla, so
at least initially he was not trying to take advantage of a new Supreme
Court ruling.189 The trial court judge hearing the coram nobis petition
denied it by concluding that deportation was not a direct consequence of the
plea.190 After Padilla, Mr. Miller appealed that decision, arguing that his
petition’s denial was now “untenable.”191
The Court of Special Appeals began with the keystone to its analysis
by noting that the denial was based upon the “well-settled Maryland (and,
indeed, national) law” that relied on the collateral/direct distinction and
only allowed guilty plea attacks when defendants were denied advice as to
the direct consequences.192 Despite Padilla’s language to the contrary, the
Miller court labeled the collateral/direct consequences distinction
“critical.”193 The court further noted the Maryland precedent accorded with
186. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (presuming that counsel have adhered to
professional norms and explaining that defendants who collaterally attack their pleas “lose
the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea”).
187. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (framing the issue
of Padilla retroactivity).
188. Id.
189. See id. (stating Mr. Miller filed his coram nobis petition June 18, 2009 and the
Supreme Court announced Padilla March 31, 2010).
190. See id. at 341–42 (concluding that deportation was only a collateral and not a
direct consequence of his conviction).
191. Id. at 342.
192. See id. at 342 (“[A] guilty plea may not be attacked on the ground that the
defendant had not been advised with respect to the collateral consequences (as opposed to
direct consequences) of the conviction.”).
193. See id. at 351 (citing Maryland case law on the “critical distinction between a
direct consequence of conviction and a collateral consequence”).
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the federal circuits but was contrary to Padilla.194 In the face of what it
labeled a “monolith of preexisting law” holding the opposite, the court
found it unreasonable to consider Padilla an application of well-settled
law.195 Instead, the court cited Justice Alito’s concurrence that the majority
opinion marked a “dramatic departure” from “longstanding and unanimous”
precedent in the federal courts and was “squarely athwart the well-worn and
familiar path.”196 Labeling Padilla a new rule, the court decided against
relief for Mr. Miller, whose conviction was “long beyond direct review.”197
Indeed, most courts that find Padilla to be a new rule refer to the fact
that eleven federal circuits and thirty states did not require attorneys to
advise defendants of collateral consequences to their guilty pleas.198
However, as Mr. Miller argued and the Court of Special Appeals observed,
distinguishing between collateral and direct consequences is now
inappropriate.199
Analyzing the Teague doctrine, the Miller court found it “clear” that
Padilla announced a new rule in that it “overruled a longstanding practice
that lower courts had uniformly approved.”200 Believing it an important
difference, the court distinguished that Padilla was not prohibited by
Supreme Court precedent but concluded that it was not dictated by
precedent.201 According to the court, the only “antecedent rumbling”

194. See id. (“Just as did the federal circuit courts of appeal, Maryland consistently held
that deportation was a collateral consequence of conviction . . . .”).
195. See id. (“[I]t is unreasonable, therefore, to say that [Padilla] did nothing but apply
predictable and well-settled law.”).
196. See id. at 347 (“The concurring opinion in [Padilla] was more introspective than
was the majority opinion.”).
197. See id. at 352 (“Accordingly, [Padilla] will not apply retroactively [to the case]
now before us.”).
198. See Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“Other district courts . . . have held that Padilla did announce a [new rule],
stressing that the result in Padilla was not dictated by precedent in the majority of federal
courts . . . .”).
199. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 343 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“The appellant is
correct that automatically rejecting a defendant’s claim on the basis of the collateral
consequence-direct consequence distinction is no longer proper.”).
200. See id. at 344–45 (applying Teague to Padilla and concluding the decision was not
dictated by precedent).
201. See id. at 345 (“[The Court was] free to go either way. That by no means implies
that the Court’s decision was one ‘dictated by precedent.’ It was simply not prohibited by its
own precedent.”).
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possibly predicting the Padilla decision came down after Mr. Miller’s
guilty plea and so offered him no relief.202
The court also accorded retroactivity weight to the Supreme Court’s
description of the dramatic change in immigration law over the past ninety
years.203 The implication, observed the court, was that the law must change
in order to accommodate the changed law.204 According to the Special
Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Supreme Court’s discussion of
prevailing professional norms was a “classic argumentative technique” to
justify changing the law to what the Court thought it ought to be.205 The
court then observed that it is irrelevant whether the Padilla majority
thought it announced a new rule.206 Instead, the court took it upon itself to
objectively measure whether Padilla did in fact change the law.207
The Seventh Circuit applied similarly arduous reasoning when it
reversed Chaidez. The majority acknowledged that the Supreme Court
expressly applied Strickland to Padilla, but concluded Padilla announced a
new rule because lower courts had held otherwise.208 So much contrary
lower court precedent suggests a new rule, according to the court, because
most lower courts were not unreasonable in holding contrary to Padilla
prior to its announcement.209 The majority “remain[ed] persuaded by the
weight of lower court authority.”210 Similarly, the court reasoned that
202. See id. at 346 (“Even as of that first fleeting hint of something ‘blowin’ in the
wind,’ the time had already long since lapsed for any direct review of the appellant’s guilty
plea of June 1, 1999.”).
203. See id. at 345–46 (stating that the Court from the outset was “responding to a
dramatically changing situation”).
204. See id. at 346 (“The implication was unmistakable that the law providing some
relief to non-citizens, far from remaining static, would have to change to meet the changing
needs of changing times, to wit, the ‘dramatic rais[ing of] the stakes.’” (quoting Padilla, 130
S. Ct. at 1480)).
205. See id. at 346–47 (“The Supreme Court was unquestionably justifying the change
it was about to make.”). “That, by definition, is making new law.” Id.
206. See id. at 347 (“Our search internally for Freudian clues as to what [Padilla]
thought about itself, however, is very secondary.”).
207. See id. (“What ultimately matters is not whether the Supreme Court majority
subjectively thought it was changing the law, but whether, as an objectively measured fact, it
did change the law.”).
208. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Our conclusion
that Padilla announced a new rule finds additional support in pre-Padilla decisions by state
and federal courts.”).
209. See id. at 692 (referring to the “large majority of federal and state courts” not
requiring counsel to advise defendants of immigration consequences of guilty pleas in the
absence of Supreme Court precedent).
210. Id.
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because Padilla includes concurring and dissenting opinions, the rule must
not have been dictated by precedent and so must be new.211
Conceding that Padilla represents an extension of Strickland, the
majority stated that such an extension is an old rule only when it is “the sole
reasonable interpretation of existing precedent.”212 The court went on to
concede that any extension of Strickland will rarely be a new rule and then
decided that Padilla was an example of that rare exception.213 The court
wondered, “[I]f Padilla is considered an old rule, it is hard to imagine an
application of Strickland that would qualify as a new rule.”214 With that
statement, the majority essentially paraphrased Justice Kennedy’s
observation that in applying Strickland, “it will be the infrequent case that
yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule.”215 Yet, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that a direct application of Strickland, guided by longestablished professional norms, must be that infrequent case.216 For the
majority, a reversal of lower court precedent carried more weight than the
professional norms that guide Strickland analyses.
As the dissent observed: “The existence of concurring and dissenting
views does not alter the fact that the prevailing professional norms at the
time of Chaidez’s plea required a lawyer to advise her of the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea.”217 The dissent further noted that the
concurring Justices in Padilla both agreed that Strickland requires attorneys
to at least advise that pleading guilty may have adverse immigration
consequences.218 The Third Circuit put it well: “It [is] ‘hardly novel’ for
counsel to provide advice to defendants at the plea stage concerning the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.”219

211. See id. at 689 (“That the members of the Padilla Court expressed such an ‘array of
views’ indicates that Padilla was not dictated by precedent.” (citing O’Dell v. Netherland,
521 U.S. 151, 159 (1997))).
212. See id. at 692 (reasoning that the fact that Padilla applies Strickland is not
conclusive on whether Padilla announced a new rule).
213. See id. at 692 (“We recognize the application of Strickland to unique facts will
generally not produce a new rule . . . .”). “We believe Padilla to be the rare exception.” Id.
214. Id.
215. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216. See Chaidez v. United States, 655 F.3d 684, at 692–93 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We
believe Padilla to be the rare exception.”).
217. Id. at 696 (Williams, J., dissenting).
218. See id. (referring to Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, which also conflicted with
lower court precedent).
219. United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011)

WHAT’S NEW IS OLD AGAIN

125

Notably, the Seventh Circuit ignored—and the Miller court addressed
only in a footnote220—the Supreme Court’s observation that: “It seems
unlikely that our decision today will have significant effect on those
convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains.”221 Clearly, the
Court anticipated some effect on convictions that preceded the Padilla
announcement.
In finding Padilla created a new rule, the Tenth Circuit advanced
similar arguments regarding lower court precedent and Padilla’s concurring
and dissenting opinions.222 The Tenth Circuit did acknowledge that Padilla
did not overturn Supreme Court precedent and that the Court had nearly ten
years prior recognized the importance of considering the deportation risk
associated with guilty pleas.223 And the court conceded, “Without doubt,
Padilla is a Strickland case.”224 Still, the court concluded Padilla
announced a new rule because “[w]hile the Supreme Court had never
foreclosed the application of Strickland to collateral consequences of a
conviction, it had never applied Strickland to them either.”225
Lower courts mirror the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland and the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in that most courts finding
against retroactivity have focused on the precedent issue.226 The courts
make two precedent arguments: one argues that existing precedent in either
the relevant circuit or State held the opposite of Padilla and so Padilla
overturned uniform law, and the second argument claims that the lack of
Supreme Court precedent meant that the announcement of Padilla created
new law.227
220. See Miller v. State, 11 A.3d 340, 347 n.5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (finding the
two “nisi prius opinions relied on by the appellant” to be “singularly unpersuasive” in that
they relied on the apparent belief of the Court that Padilla would be fully retroactive).
221. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485 (emphasis added).
222. See United States v. Chang Hong, ___F.3d___, 2011 WL 3805763, at *6 (10th
Cir. 2011) (identifying lower court precedents contrary to Padilla and observing Justice
Alito’s concurrence and Justice Scalia’s dissent).
223. See id. at *7 (summarizing counter-arguments that Padilla is not a new rule).
224. Id. at *5.
225. Id. at *7.
226. See Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL 528804, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“Other district courts . . . have held that Padilla did announce a [new rule],
stressing that the result in Padilla was not dictated by precedent in the majority of the federal
courts.”).
227. See United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *3 (D. Neb.
Nov. 9, 2010) (finding against retroactivity because neither Supreme Court nor the Eighth
Circuit precedent required advising defendants of immigration consequences prior to
Padilla); see also United States v. Gilbert, No. 2:03-cr-00349-WJM-1, 2010 WL 4134286,
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Also, like Miller, some courts have argued that the only hint at the
Padilla decision was 2001 dicta that in no way dictated the ultimate result
of Padilla.228 One court concluded it was “unlikely” that the defendant
could show that prevailing professional norms counseled attorneys to
advise defendants of possible immigration consequences at the time the
defendant’s conviction became final.229 Notably, in that case the conviction
became final in 1997, and in the same dicta referred to by other courts, the
Supreme Court observed that prevailing professional norms dating back to
1982 advised attorneys to do what Padilla now requires.230
C. Evading Retroactivity
Some courts have concluded that determining the retroactivity
question is not necessary to decide the cases before them because the
defendants could not clear the prejudice hurdle.231 In order to succeed in
overturning a guilty plea under Hill v. Lockhart: “[T]he defendant must
show that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.”232 Some courts have taken this tack
because the Supreme Court, in Strickland, instructed as much: “If it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be
followed.”233

at *3 (D. N.J. Oct. 19, 2010) (“Neither the Third Circuit nor the Supreme Court have ever
ruled on whether or not an attorney must make a client aware of possible future immigration
proceedings in order to comply with the 6th Amendment prior to the Padilla case.”).
228. See People v. Kabre, 905 N.Y.S.2d 887, 892–93 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (finding
that the dicta in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) did not provide a clear
signal from the Supreme Court that dictated the result in Padilla).
229. See Haddad v. United States, No. 97-80150, 2010 WL 2884645, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
July 20, 2010) (concluding that defendant could not show prevailing professional norms in
1997 required the same as the Supreme Court now requires under Padilla). The Haddad
court also found it “unlikely” that Padilla will be applied retroactively and “equally
unlikely” that defendant could show prejudice. Id.
230. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 n.48 (2001) (citing the 1982 edition of the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice for the practice guideline that counsel “should fully
advise the defendant of [deportation] consequences”).
231. See United States v. Gutierrez Martinez, No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490, at *3
(D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2010) (stating that in the face of Padilla retroactivity confusion, some
courts have denied collateral relief because defendant could not show prejudice).
232. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)
233. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).
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Courts have used different aspects of individual cases in disposing of
defendants’ claims on prejudice grounds. One court decided that a
defendant’s claims obviated the need to discuss Padilla retroactivity.234
Noting uncertainty on the issue, the court assumed without deciding that
Padilla applies retroactively and denied the defendant’s claims on the
prejudice prong.235 Another court first decided that Padilla does apply
retroactively then denied relief on prejudice grounds.236 The finding of
prejudice was based on the fact that both the judge and the plea agreement
informed the defendant of deportation risks.237 Yet another court, after
finding that Padilla did not apply retroactively, added that even if its
nonretroactivity conclusion was wrong, the defendant could not show
prejudice because he had other criminal charges subjecting him to
deportation.238
One court concluded the defendant could not show prejudice where the
sentencing judge informed the defendant that deportation was likely.239 A
wrinkle in that case was that the defendant was an illegal alien and so was
subject to deportation regardless of the guilty plea.240 The court also found
this fact sufficient to show a lack of prejudice.241

234. See United States v. Obonaga, No. 10-CV-2951, 2010 WL 2710413, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2010) (denying defendant’s claims because both his plea agreement and
the judge, during allocution, expressly articulated that the defendant would be deported
following a guilty plea).
235. See id. at *2 (“[E]ven if counsel erred in failing to inform him that he might get
deported, [defendant] nevertheless ‘underst[ood]’ this risk before he pled guilty.”). “It
follows then that counsel’s alleged error did not prejudice [defendant].” Id.
236. See Al Kokabani v. United States, No. 5:06-CR-207-FL, 2010 WL 3941836, at
*6–7 (E.D.N.C. July 30, 2010) (finding Padilla applicable but granting summary judgment
to the government because defendant was aware of the possible deportation consequences of
his guilty plea).
237. See id. at *6 (“Thus, at the time he pled guilty, [p]etitioner clearly understood he
was risking adverse immigration consequences by doing so.”).
238. See United States v. Perez, No. 8:02CR296, 2010 WL 4643033, at *3 (D. Neb.
Nov. 9, 2010) (finding that the defendant would still be subject to deportation because if his
federal guilty plea was vacated, his state charges would be reinstated).
239. See United States v. Gutierrez Martinez, No. 10-2553, 2010 WL 5266490, at *4
(D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2010) (“[D]uring the sentencing hearing, the [c]ourt informed Gutierrez
Martinez he would likely be deported.”).
240. See id. (noting that defendant’s presentencing report listed him as being in the
country illegally since 2003).
241. See id. (finding that where his guilty plea did not affect his deportation status, the
defendant did not suffer prejudice because the deportation decision “would not have affected
his decision whether to plead or go to trial”).
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The Supreme Court indicated that courts might dispose of claims
seeking relief under Padilla in this manner; when dismissing the floodgates
concerns, it said: “There is no reason to doubt that lower courts—now
quite experienced with applying Strickland—can effectively and efficiently
use its framework to separate specious claims from those with substantial
merit.”242 Yet, prejudice has not been a uniformly insurmountable hurdle
for petitioners; Roselva Chaidez successfully showed the court that she
would prefer trial to the near automatic deportation resulting from her
guilty plea.243 Importantly, Ms. Chaidez had received probation for her
sentence, and her plea was entered without the benefit of a written plea
agreement.244 Further, the government did not rebut her testimony that she
would have preferred to risk prison over almost certain deportation in order
to gain the chance to stay with her family.245
A New York court found another way of avoiding retroactivity when it
found that because the relevant immigration law was unclear, counsel’s
nonadvice was bad practice but not constitutionally deficient.246 This
decision appears to be consistent with Padilla’s limitation on its holding.247
The New York court also distinguished the case before it in that the
nonadvice on unclear law regarded completion of a drug treatment
program.248 The court found counsel to be effective and distinguished the
case from ineffective assistance of counsel cases because the defendant
242. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
243. See United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 6, 2010) (concluding that Ms. Chaidez would have gone to trial if she had known of
the immigration consequences of the guilty plea).
244. See id. (“Chaidez entered her guilty plea without the benefit of a plea
agreement.”).
245. See id. (giving particular credit to her testimony that the risk of jail was worth the
opportunity to avoid deportation).
246. See People v. Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d 833, 845 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010) (“Given the
particular circumstances of defendant’s plea and plea counsel’s accurate, albeit incomplete,
advice, the Court finds that plea counsel satisfied her ‘more limited’ constitutional duty
under Padilla to ‘do no more than advise a non-citizen client that pending criminal charges
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.’” (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at
1483)).
247. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (“There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous
situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or
uncertain . . . .”). “[Then], a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a
noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences.” Id. (emphasis added).
248. See Cristache, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 845 (“Defendant, of course, may have been in a
better legal position to argue that plea counsel was deficient, had his guilty pleas been
vacated upon his successful completion of drug treatment.”).
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failed to uphold his end of the bargain and so placed himself in the
precarious position.249
D. Beyond Immigration
Some advocate expanding Padilla beyond the immigration context,
arguing that other collateral consequences—such as loss of child custody,
loss of government benefits, or loss of professional privileges—are all
equally as serious as deportation.250 And, they argue, the reasoning behind
the Padilla decision applies to those consequences with equal force.251
Some appellate courts agree and have already applied Padilla beyond
the immigration context.252 These decisions highlight how the retroactivity
of Padilla might affect more than immigration law. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit extended Padilla’s reasoning to sex offender civil
commitments in vacating Gary Bauder’s guilty plea.253 And the Georgia
Court of Appeals agreed that the Padilla reasoning applies equally to sex
offender registration.254
249. See id. (“Defendant’s insurmountable problem is the particular facts of his case.
He failed to complete treatment and is now reaping the precise consequences about which he
was warned by plea counsel.”).
250. See Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 24 (arguing that certain collateral
consequences beyond deportation also can result and also are of supreme importance to
defendants); Roberts, supra note 6, at 170 (arguing that defendants require advice on
collateral consequences to make an informed guilty plea); see also Commonwealth v.
Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090, 1094–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (applying Padilla to the statutory
loss of pension benefits from a criminal conviction).
251. See Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 24 (“The logic of Padilla, then, is not
restricted to immigration consequences, but extends to the various ways in which Congress
and the states have made criminal conviction legally operative in contexts beyond the formal
sentence imposed by the court.”).
252. See Bauder v. Dept. of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (replacing
“immigration” with “collateral” consequences in requiring counsel to advise defendants of
civil commitment consequences to guilty pleas); Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535, 538–39
(Alaska Ct. App. 2010) (citing Padilla—without addressing retroactivity—to support a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel for inaccurately advising on the civil
consequences of a no contest plea); see also Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 23 (arguing
that the logic of Padilla applies to many collateral consequences).
253. See Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1275 (“[T]he Supreme Court has noted that when the law
is unclear a criminal defense attorney must advise his client that the ‘pending criminal
charges may carry a risk of adverse [collateral] consequences.’” (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct.
at 1483)).
254. See Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 387–89 (Ga. App. 2010) (concluding the
factors deciding Padilla to be equally applicable to the consequences of sex offender
registration).
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Note that Padilla not only limited its language to immigration law, but
its reasoning specifically rested on changes in immigration law.255 Further,
the Court specifically labeled deportation as “uniquely difficult to classify
as either a direct or collateral consequence.”256 The Court carefully applied
Strickland only to deportation.257 Notably, in extending Padilla to civil
commitment, the Eleventh Circuit, in quoting Padilla, changed the Court’s
word “immigration” to “[collateral]” despite the Court’s refusal to apply the
labels direct and collateral.258
As these courts show, the reasoning of Padilla can be persuasive when
applied to other contexts.259 Many collateral consequences result from law
that is relatively clear and readily available to attorneys.260 Professional
norms can often be shown to counsel attorneys to advise their clients on
such consequences.261 And defendants surely would consider many
collateral consequences, such as deportation, to be more punitive than the
direct consequence of prison.262 As noted above, the Supreme Court
continues to apply Strickland to new factual contexts, and doing so has yet
to yield a new rule.263

255. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82 (including deportation within the scope of the
Sixth Amendment entitlement to effective assistance of counsel because of the increasing
integration of immigration and criminal law).
256. Id. at 1476.
257. See id. at 1482 (“The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to
evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation.”) (emphasis
added).
258. Bauder v. Dept. of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010).
259. See Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 24 (“The logic of Padilla, then, is not
restricted to immigration consequences, but extends to the various ways in which Congress
and the states have made criminal conviction legally operative in contexts beyond the formal
sentence imposed by the court.”).
260. See id. at 25 (listing serious collateral consequences and the statutes that impose
them).
261. See id. (“By the early 1980s, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Legal
Status of Prisoners described collateral consequences as ‘archaic,’ and proposed that they
were headed for extinction.”).
262. See id. (“[I]t might be said that for many people convicted of crime, the resulting
status is the punishment.”).
263. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *6 (E.D.
Cal. July 1, 2010) (“The Supreme Court has issued a number of relatively recent opinions
applying the Strickland test in a variety of different factual contexts; none of these cases has
been afforded new rule status under Teague.” (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380
(2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391
(2000))).
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Perhaps the most important and practical consequence of Padilla is
that courts and counsel, having read Padilla and applying its logic, will
now, as a best practice, advise defendants of all foreseeable and relevant
collateral consequences beyond deportation.264
V. Padilla Applies Retroactively
In Padilla, seven Justices agreed that Strickland decided the case and
that, at a minimum, a criminal defense attorney must advise her client that
there may be adverse immigration consequences to pleading guilty.265 One
wonders how the Court could have stated more clearly: “Strickland applies
to Padilla’s claim.”266
Those who argue against retroactivity focus on the newness of
Padilla’s holding.267 But the decision was new to the lower courts, not to
the Supreme Court.268 The lower courts applied an as yet unnecessary
distinction between direct and collateral consequences that cut against the
prevailing professional norms that guide Strickland analyses.269 The
Supreme Court did not overrule its own precedent, and a decision that
overturns lower court precedent does not automatically create a new rule.270
264. See Chin & Love, supra note 132, at 32 (predicting that after Padilla, courts and
counsel—including prosecutors—will advise defendants of many collateral consequences in
order to avoid appellate courts vacating guilty plea agreements).
265. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483, 1487 (requiring at least advice regarding possible
deportation consequences).
266. Id. at 1482.
267. See United States v. Chaidez, No. 03 CR 636-6, 2010 WL 3979664, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 6, 2010) (finding support for concluding Padilla created a new rule in contrary, prePadilla lower court holdings); Mudahinyuka v. United States, No. 10 C 5812, 2011 WL
528804, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (“Other district courts . . . have held that Padilla did
announce a [new rule], stressing that the result in Padilla was not dictated by precedent in
the majority of federal courts . . . .”).
268. See Leading Case, supra note 137, at 204 (“While the decision is not inconsistent
with the Court’s prior opinions, it overturns nearly unanimous agreement among state and
federal courts.”). “Despite Justice Scalia’s protestations, the majority is correct that the
Court has never actually distinguished between direct and collateral consequences in the
right to counsel context . . . .” Id. at 204 n.64.
269. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“Whether that distinction is appropriate is a
question we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”).
“The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her
client regarding the risk of deportation.” Id. at 1482.
270. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990) (“The explicit overruling of an
earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule; it is more difficult, however, to determine
whether we announce a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases.”).

132

18 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 095 (2011)

Padilla represents an example of a decision that overrules lower court
precedent and nonetheless applies retroactively.
Padilla applies retroactively because the Court straightforwardly
applied Strickland, which, according to the Court, is clearly established
law.271 It has been suggested that applying Strickland to new facts might
never create a new rule for retroactivity purposes.272 The Court has
previously stated: “Strickland guides virtually all ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.”273 In fact, the Court has recently applied Strickland to new
factual contexts and each case has been found to apply retroactively.274
Strickland will often lead to new results because it exemplifies a rule
of general applicability that requires a case-by-case examination of the
facts.275 This type of rule will not create a new rule for Teague purposes
when it is applied in novel factual contexts. 276 Strickland, the Court has
said, because it is so clearly established as a rule, cannot be construed as
breaking new ground or imposing new obligations on government.277 In
Padilla, the Court acknowledged that lower courts are now “quite
experienced with applying Strickland” and “can effectively and efficiently
use its framework” to apply it in cases where counsel failed to advise a
defendant about possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea.278
271. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“It is past question that the rule
set forth in Strickland qualifies as ‘clearly established Federal law. . . .’” (quoting Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
272. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308–09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Where the [retroactivity issue involves] a rule of this general application, a rule designed
for the specific purposes of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent
case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule . . . .”).
273. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he Strickland test provides sufficient guidance
for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims . . . .”).
274. See Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Williams, Wiggins,
and Rompilla are not new law under Teague . . . . In [those cases], the Court did nothing
more than apply Strickland’s standard to a specific set of circumstances . . . .” (citing
Williams, 529 U.S. at 395; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Rompilla v. Beard,
545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005))).
275. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he Strickland test ‘of necessity requires a caseby-case examination of the evidence . . . .’” (quoting Wright, 505 U.S. at 308–09) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
276. See Wright, 505 U.S. at 308–09 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Where the
[retroactivity issue involves] a rule of this general application, a rule designed for the
specific purposes of evaluating myriad factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that
yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule.”).
277. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (“[I]t can hardly be said that
recognizing the right to effective counsel ‘breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the States.’” (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301)).
278. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
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The Court did not state Teague as among its reasons for believing that
Padilla will not open the floodgates to new litigation.279 Instead, the Court
presumed “that counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice
at the time their clients considered pleading guilty.”280 Additionally, the
Court noted Strickland’s “high bar” that requires a defendant to “convince
the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational
under the circumstances.”281 Defendants willing to attempt that persuasion
have the additional disincentive that collaterally attacking their guilty plea
means “los[ing] the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the
plea . . .,” which “ultimately . . . may result in a less favorable outcome for
the defendant.”282 Despite disagreement over the reach of the majority
opinion, neither the concurrence nor the dissent expressed alarm that there
was no mention of Teague or retroactivity as a bar to future claims seeking
relief under Padilla.283 And, as one court observed, the entire floodgates
discussion would be unnecessary if the Court did not intend Padilla to
apply retroactively.284
Further, the Court’s own language plainly signals its anticipation
(perhaps its foregone conclusion) that Padilla would apply retroactively:
“It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on
those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains.”285 The
Court could not intend Padilla to apply only prospectively if it considered
at least some effect on convictions “already obtained” as of the date of the
decision.286
The decision represents a straightforward application of Strickland to a
new factual context, and it remains consistent with prevailing professional
norms, which guide Strickland analyses.287
Thus, Padilla applies
retroactively.
279. See id. at 1484–86 (dismissing concerns that Padilla would open the floodgates to
defendants attacking guilty pleas).
280. Id. at 1485.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1485–86.
283. See United States v. Chaidez, 730 F.Supp. 2d 896, 903 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“In
Padilla, despite three separate opinions, no member of the Court even mentioned Teague or
any retroactivity issue.”).
284. See United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at *7 (E.D.
Cal. July 1, 2010) (“If the Court intended Padilla to be a new rule which would apply only
prospectively, the entire ‘floodgates’ discussion would have been unnecessary.”).
285. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485.
286. Id. (emphasis added).
287. See id. (“‘The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
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VI. Conclusion

After Padilla, attorneys are on notice that the Supreme Court might
one day recognize other collateral consequences as rising to the same level
of severity as deportation. At a minimum, counsel should advise
defendants of the relevant, potentially adverse, collateral consequences that
might result from their conviction. When such consequences result from
succinct and straightforward law, counsel should be careful to provide
correct advice to their clients. Prosecutors too, in order to protect the
finality, accuracy, and fairness of guilty pleas should include in plea
agreements advice and disclosures of the relevant collateral consequences
that are likely to result from the defendant pleading guilty.
As Justice Stevens said, “By bringing [all] consequences into this
process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements
that better satisfy the interests of both parties.”288

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984))).
288. Id. at 1486.

